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BOOK REVIEW
Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky,
Litigating International Commercial Disputes
1996 Edition
Reviewed by
Eric E. Bergsten
Increased international trade and investment bring with
them increased litigation between parties from different countries. Sometimes the litigation is in this country, sometimes in
another and sometimes it takes the form of arbitration. Whichever form it may take and wherever it may take place, international commercial litigation poses problems for the lawyers and
for the parties that are in addition to, and to some degree different from, the problems that are posed in any litigation. Who
has jurisdiction over the dispute? How is a law suit commenced
against a foreign defendant, and even more so, against a foreign
sovereign? How is evidence obtained that may be located in a
foreign country? Will a foreign court help if requested to do so,
and will our courts help a foreign court if so requested? Conversely, will the foreign court interfere with a law suit in this
country and will our courts interfere in a law suit in the foreign
country? Once there is a judgment in a United States' court,
will it be executed in a foreign country? Will a United States'
court execute the judgment of a foreign court?
To an American lawyer not experienced in international litigation it may seem that the answers could be found in our experience in interstate litigation. Seen from New York, the
courts of New Jersey and Connecticut are foreign courts, as are
the courts of Ontario or France. The difficulties are deceptively
similar. The solution for the most pressing of those difficulties
was adopted in 1787. A judgments convention, known as the
299
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Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, provided that
the judgments of the courts of those foreign states that were
party to the "convention" would be enforced. The qualification
that the foreign court had to have had jurisdiction before its
judgment was worthy of full faith and credit had been understood from the beginning. At first the criteria for determining
whether the foreign court (e.g., the New Jersey court) had had
jurisdiction had to flow out of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
itself,1 but later the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was pressed into service. Use of the Due Process
Clause had the advantage of permitting the defendant to argue
at the outset of the process in the court of the "foreign" state
that the Constitution prohibited the court from exercising jurisdiction, even if it had jurisdiction under its own local law. Since
the criteria under the Due Process Clause for determining
whether the assertion of jurisdiction was constitutionally valid
were meant to assure that "requiring the defendant to appear in
the courts of the state does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice' 2 those criteria could as well be applied to determine whether the court in Ontario or France had
had jurisdiction when an application was made to enforce a
judgment of a court from those jurisdictions (p. 21).
But that is one of the problems. The courts of Ontario or of
France are foreign to a New York court in a different sense than
are the courts of New Jersey or of Connecticut. Their procedures, their conceptions of "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice", their policy choices are not necessarily the
same as those in this country. It is not self-evident that the
rules developed for interstate litigation apply appropriately to
international litigation. Therefore, special rules have had to be
worked out - some of the time - while some of the time the rules
for interstate adjudication serve for international adjudication
as well. Even for the experts it is not always easy to figure it
out.
Mr. Newman and Mr. Zaslowsky have undertaken to help
us figure it out. Mr. Newman is Chairman of the Litigation Department of the New York office of Baker & McKenzie, while
1 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
2 (quoting International Shoe Co. V. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 316
(1945)).
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Mr. Zaslowsky is a partner in that same Department. They
both have substantial experience in international litigation,
and they know how to explain the issues to non-specialists.
That talent has been honed over the years in the many articles
on domestic and international litigation that Mr. Newman and
Mr. Zaslowsky have written with associates from Baker & McKenzie and others in the New York Law Journal.
While the articles in the New York Law Journal and the
current book have much in common, there are two basic differences. First, the articles are short, episodic and often focused
on a recent court decision of interest. 3 Secondly, the readers of
the New York Law Journal are primarily practicing lawyers in
the metropolitan area, many of whom are also litigators. The
conception of the current book is different. It was written as an
integrated whole and it "is intended to be both a manual or
handbook and a reference work, through which salient issues in
international commercial cases may be identified and dealt
with" (p. xiii). The intended audience is, according to the authors' Preface, "practicing lawyers who do not specialize in international litigation, corporate counsel, foreign lawyers
interested in obtaining an understanding of the considerations
involved in participating in lawsuits in this country, judges and,
of course, law students desiring a 'hornbook' that deals straightforwardly with the key subjects covered in courses on transnational litigation" (pp. xii-xiii). This is a book written by
practitioners. They are not concerned with legal theory or with
a "better rule"; only on occasion is there a criticism of the courts
or of legislation.4 They are concerned with the practical conduct
3 A compilation of 46 articles written between 1982 and 1992 has been pub-

lished as Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows,

THE PRACTICE OF INTERNA-

Considered as short chapters, they give a
remarkably coherent picture of the issues. Nevertheless, their origin as topical
articles in a daily publication remains evident.
4 About as strong a criticism that they make is in respect to the First Circuit's holding in Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1992). The court
said that an applicant under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782, the provision which authorizes
federal courts to give assistance to foreign and international tribunals to secure
evidence for use in the foreign tribunal, must make a showing that the information
sought is "discoverable under foreign law." The authors suggest that "rather than
reading into the statute a reciprocity requirement that Congress did not include,
courts might consider exercising their discretionary powers to assure that orders
TIONAL LITIGATION, Vol. 1 (1992).

for the production of evidence under Section 1782 do not create any unfairness" (p.

202).
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of litigation, and that is a big enough subject. Messrs. Newman
and Zaslowsky have succeeded amazingly well in writing a book
that fits the needs of the somewhat diverse audience they have
targeted.
One suspects that the audience most in the view of the authors were foreign lawyers. Two of the three Forewords are
written by English jurists of note. 5 The first chapter gives an
overview of litigation in the United States and compares it both
with procedures found in England and Commonwealth countries and with procedures found in civil law countries.
Throughout the book there are comparisons to procedures fol6
lowed in other countries in regard to the issue in question.
Without that introduction and the constant references to foreign procedures, much of what follows would, I suspect, be difficult for a foreign audience to understand. It is a common
experience when reading a book or article on an aspect of a foreign legal system that, even if the words are understood and the
law in the foreign country concerned is somewhat familiar, the
discussion cannot be understood because the author assumed
certain knowledge that the reader did not have. The authors
have attempted to reduce that problem for the foreign readers
of this book. In doing so, they have often also explained to an
American reader why the issue in question is not as easily
solved as one might otherwise have expected.
Nevertheless, I suspect that many foreign lawyers who use
this book will find that they lack the basic knowledge of American federalism that is necessary to understand many of the issues. As pointed out in chapter 1, "[t]here are in the United
States 51 separate courts systems-a federal court system and
a separate system in each of the 50 states" (p. 1)7 The rest of
the section, however, discusses only the basic organization of
5 Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and Professor Roy Goode
of Oxford. The third Foreword was written by Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld of
New York University School of Law.
6 For example, more space is given in chapter 2 to pre-judgment attachments
in foreign countries than in the United States. The discussion serves the practical
purpose of indicating the possibilities of such attachments in aid of litigation in the
United States. It also serves to give some points of comparison with the law in the
U.S.
7 The statement slightly understates the number of court systems since it
leaves out the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and a few other associated
territories.
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the federal court system. In fact, the book is really about international commercial litigation in the federal courts, with a few
nods to the state courts, especially those of New York. 8 As understandable and inevitable as that choice may be, especially in
a book of only 240 pages of text, plus annexes, is the foreign
lawyer (or non-specialist domestic lawyer or law student) to assume that the state courts other than those of New York do not
conduct international commercial litigation?
But there is worse. The major difficulties do not come from
the existence of 50+ state court systems, but from 50+ state
legal systems with their rules of jurisdiction and procedure
binding on the state courts and, to a constantly shifting and decidedly confusing extent, on the Federal District Courts that sit
in those states. The problem is perhaps most acute in explaining the question of personal jurisdiction of the courts over foreign defendants, a subject treated in chapter 3. The authors
start by pointing out clearly that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a
foreign party may be obtained either under traditional bases
[consent, presence, domicile and physical power] or under 'longarm' statutes, primarily those enacted by the states" (p. 19).
They survey, in a satisfactory manner, the more recent
Supreme Court decisions delineating the outward limits of longarm jurisdiction. What is not clear from the discussion at that
point is that the jurisdiction in question is that of a court sitting
in a particular state, even if the court is a federal court. If they
are attentive, they will find it in the following discussion on the
federal long-arm statute. Presumably American readers will already know that for most purposes determination of which Federal District Court has the authority to hear a case is a question
of jurisdiction and not of venue; foreign readers could be excused for not.
It seems that what would be necessary would be a preliminary chapter on the American constitutional doctrines of federalism, a task that is far beyond the scope of this book. It is
necessary simply to acknowledge that at least one segment of
the intended audience may have a difficult time understanding
aspects of it unless they have had an extensive exposure to the
s The table of statutes shows one citation to the statutes of Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas, two to Wisconsin, three to
California and forty to New York.
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American legal system elsewhere. Of course, with the large
number of foreign law graduates coming the United States for
an L.L.M., more and more of them will have had that exposure.
The fourteen chapters that constitute the heart of the book
cover in brief form the major issues in international litigation.
The fourteen appendices set forth the most important statutes,
rules and treaties in the field. What is striking about both the
textual discussion and the appendices is the extent of the fundamental changes in attitude and legal rule that have occurred
during the last thirty years. There is hardly a chapter in this
book that sets forth rules prevailing in the mid-1960's that
could still be relied upon today.
The most striking change is the recognition that an effective structure for international litigation requires international
agreement. Thirty years ago the United States was a party to
no multilateral convention affecting international litigation.
The appendices contain five multilateral conventions which the
United States has joined since that time: Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters (1965), 9 Inter-American Convention on
Letters Rogatory (1975) with Additional Protocol (1979),10 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970),11 Hague Convention Abolishing
Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents
(1961)12 and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). 13 The Inter-American
14
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1975)
might have been added.
The negotiation of a multilateral convention and its adoption by individual States is not a guarantee that the convention
will serve its intended purpose, especially if one of the purposes
is to limit the manner in which the States have previously acted. So it has been with the Service Convention and the Evidence Convention in the United States. The Service Convention
9 The United States joined in 1969.
10 The United States joined in 1988.
11
12
13
14

The
The
The
The

United
United
United
United

States joined in 1972.
States joined in 1981.
States joined in 1970.
States joined in 1990.
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had two fundamental purposes. The first was to facilitate service in foreign countries. The traditional method was to forward the request for service through diplomatic channels to a
foreign court by means of a letter rogatory. A time consuming
process at best, and one that too often resulted in silence. The
letter rogatory was dispatched, but there was no assurance that
there would ever be a return indicating that service had been
made. The Service Convention simplifies the process by requiring a Contracting State to designate a Central Authority to

which requests for service can be addressed. 15 The Central Authority either serves the document itself or arranges to have it
served by an appropriate agency of the requested State. No
longer does the requesting foreign party have to attempt to determine which agency would be appropriate. Nevertheless, service through the Central Authority may be time-consuming,
running from about two months according to the Hague Conference on Private International Law16 to six to eighteen months
in some countries, according to "Department of Justice officials
with personal experience in these matters" (p. 63).
The second purpose of the Service Convention was to restrict certain forms of service on foreign persons that raised
questions in the State of the person served. Article 10, for example, says that "[provided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with-" the
sending of judicial documents through the mails, or directly addressing judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of
the State of destination. Some States considered the sending of
judicial documents from a foreign State directly to a recipient in
their State as being an infringement of their sovereignty, and it
is no surprise that a number of Contracting States have made
the objection anticipated by Article 10.17 The consequence has

been that service by mail to a State that is a party to the Service
15 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, February 10, 1969, art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658
U.N.T.S. 163.
16 State Department Circular Concerning Hague Service Convention (May
1995), reprinted Appendix F (p. Appendix F).
17 Supra, note 15, art.10. Countries that have objected to all or part of Article

10 include Botswana, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany,
Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Seychelles, Sweden, Turkey and the United

Kingdom.
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Convention and that has made an Article 10 objection is an invalid service, even though it would have otherwise been proper
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the courts
were split as to whether such a result was required by the Service Convention, new Rule 4(f) adopted in 1993 would seem to
make it clear that service in a foreign State may not be made by
means prohibited by international agreement, including by
means to which the relevant State party to the Service Convention has objected (p. 64).
But what if the local means of service on a foreign defendant does not require service in the foreign country? It is obvious
that service can be made in the forum State if the defendant is
resident or doing business there. It is not so obvious that service can be made on a substituted party in the forum State and
still be in conformity with the Convention. That was the issue
faced by the Supreme Court in Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v.

Schlunk. 18 The case involved a wrongful death action in the Illinois courts. After the original defendant, Volkswagen of
America, Inc., denied that it had designed or sold the automobile, plaintiffs amended the complaint to add the German parent as a defendant. Service on the parent was made in
accordance with Illinois law by serving the subsidiary. The
German parent moved to quash service on the grounds that the
plaintiff had not complied with the Service Convention.
Article 1 of the Service Convention provides that it applies
"in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad." The Supreme Court held that the Convention did not
apply since no service abroad was required. 19
It is of particular interest that this decision by the Supreme
Court, which does not seem to be in full compliance with the
spirit of the Service Convention, was not criticized when it was
discussed in The Hague by the Special Commission of States

18

486 U.S. 694 (1988).

19 The Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in regard to the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory in Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634,
(5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 577 (1994). The court held that the Convention by the terms of Article 2 "shall apply to letters rogatory", and that it, therefore, did not apply where there was no occasion to use a letter rogatory.
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party to the Convention. 20 The Special Commission accepted
the principle that each state would have to decide under its own
law whether service abroad was required. The Special Commission recognized the danger that substituted service on a person
who had not been expressly designated as an agent to receive
service or process might not give timely notice of the legal action to the person to be served. That would be especially true of
a country that lacked "a 'safety net' such as that offered by the
clause of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights guaranteeing 'due process of law."' 2 1 Therefore, such substituted service in some countries might cause concerns for the other States
party to the Service Convention, but it did not cause the same
concern when it happened in the United States.
Schlunk did not infringe upon any significant interest of
any of the other States. Even so, it would be well to accept the
practical advice of the authors that "notwithstanding Schlunk,
counsel would be well advised to follow the requirements of the
Hague Service Convention if there is a possibility that it will be
necessary to enforce any eventual judgment outside the United
States" (p. 62).
The interests of the other States party were infringed to a
much greater degree when the Supreme Court held in SocigtM
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa 22 that the Hague Evidence Convention was not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence located in the territory of a State party to the Convention.
The long history of foreign resistance to the extensive evidence
gathering proclivities of Americans, whether for private litigation or for public investigations, is well known. In part the
resistance is based on the fact that the inquisitorial system of
adjudication in civil law countries leaves no room for party investigation of the facts as it is practiced in this country (p. 139).
"Further, even many common law nations are uncomfortable
with the unusual freedom and responsibility accorded to the lit20 Report on the work of the Special Commission of April 1989 on the operation of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and of 18 March
1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 1558 (1989).
21 Id. at paragraph 13.
22 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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igants themselves under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"
(p. 139).
It was to be expected that the Evidence Convention would
be seen in many countries as a means both of facilitating the
gathering of evidence in foreign countries in general and of limiting the means and scope of evidence gathering in foreign countries in the course of U.S. litigation. Another way of looking at
the matter is, as stated by the authors, that "[t]he Hague Evidence Convention has its drawbacks in the form of restrictions
on evidence-gathering methods" (p. 140) That seems to be the
way the U.S. courts are looking at it as well since, again as remarked by the authors, the "likelihood... is that most courts
will place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking to utilize the Hague Evidence Convention procedures, and discovery
will proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local
state rules" (p. 144).
It is interesting to note that the Hague Evidence Convention is of no particular importance to litigants who need to obtain evidence in the United States for use in foreign and
international tribunals. In 1964, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 was
amended to authorize the Federal District Court "of the district
in which a person resides or is found [to] order him to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."
The order may direct that the testimony or statement be given
or the document produced before a person appointed by the
court and the order may prescribe that the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal be followed for the taking of the testimony or statement or for the
production of the document or other thing. Since the statute
does not limit the persons who might be appointed by the district court to citizens of the United States, it sometimes happens that the person appointed is from the foreign country in
question. It could even happen that the foreign tribunal might
itself come to the United States to take the evidence under the
authority of the district court.
The legislative history of the 1964 amendment makes it
clear that this unilateral extension of aid to foreign and international tribunals was done in part in the hope that it would encourage other countries to extend the same aid to litigation
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taking place in this country. To a certain degree the Hague Evidence Convention is the response of other countries to our initiative. It is understandable that there should be a sense of
disenchantment among U.S. litigators when the aid received
under the Convention does not match up to the aid given under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1782.
The disparity between the evidence gathering possibilities
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 and the Hague Evidence Convention
raises the question as to whether a U.S. court should order discovery as practiced under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when no similar discovery possibilities would have been possible in the country where the litigation was taking place. Apparently, the majority of the courts that have considered the issue
have reached the conclusion that ordering discovery in such a
situation threatened to "allow litigants to circumvent the restrictions imposed on discovery by foreign tribunals" with the
result of impeding the development of international cooperation
among courts (p. 196).23 A second argument made by at least
one Court of Appeals as grounds to deny relief under Section
1782 when similar discovery would not be available in the foreign country is that granting relief would place a United States
party to the foreign litigation at a substantial disadvantage to
the foreign party (p. 201).24 The foreign party could get extensive discovery in the United States while the United States
party could not get similar discovery of the foreign party (p.
201). Fairness between the parties precluded such a result.
The authors clearly do not agree with the analysis or the
result. They cite at length the House of Lords decision in South
CarolinaIns. Co. v. "Seven Provinces"25 to the effect that thirdparty discovery in the U.S. did not constitute a violation of English process. The authors conclude, "[t]hus, the rationale ...
that, by limiting discovery, a court avoids affronting foreign
tribunals, thus fostering 'international cooperation,' has not, at
least with respect to England, found support in reported decisions from courts outside the United States" (p. 197). Fortunately, the Second Circuit has taken a "more liberal approach."
23 (Quoting In re the Court of the Commissioner of Patents For the Republic of
South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 at 77 (E.D.Pa. 1980)).
24 (Citing Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992)).
25 [1986] 3 All Eng. Rep. 487.
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In Malev HungarianAirlines v. Technologies International,26
the court accepted that Section 1782 was intended to be as liberal as its literal wording indicated. No restrictions on the
availability of relief had been established by Congress, and
none should be read in by the courts. According to the Second
Circuit, it was sufficient, in order to achieve fairness and efficiency, for the district court to use its power under the section to
issue orders that "prescribe the practice and procedure ... for
taking the testimony or statement or producing the document
27
or other thing."
The adoption of multilateral conventions in aid of litigation
has not come to an end. The most striking omission from the
above list is any convention on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. As the authors point out, "[tihe United
States is not a signatory to any treaties providing for enforcement of judgments from other countries." What they do not say,
but what is self-evident, is that the United States is not a signatory to any treaties providing for enforcement by foreign countries of judgments rendered by United States courts. A
keystone of American federalism, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, has no counterpoint for the United States in the international world. Foreign judgments are enforced on the basis of
unilaterally determined criteria and procedures. To add to the
confusion, "there is no federal statute governing this area of
law. Accordingly, one must look to the law of the particular
state in which one is seeking to enforce a judgment" (p. 165).
Similarly, foreign courts enforce judgments of United States
courts on the basis of their unilaterally determined criteria and
procedures. The authors describe the criteria and procedures of
two important foreign countries, Germany and England (pp.
187-190).
The authors draw certain practical conclusions from the examples they have given:
First, careful consideration should be given at the outset of a lawsuit as to where the judgment is likely to be enforced and the
steps that should be taken to comply with the service requirements of that country. Second, default situations should be dealt
with carefully, both by the plaintiff and the defendant.... Third,
26
27

964 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861 (1992).
Malev Hungarian Airlines v. Technologies International, 964 F.2d at 102.
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defendants should be cautious about making appearances,
whether written or oral, in proceedings where they do not intend
to contest the merits if their jurisdictional objects are denied.
And, fourth, early consideration should be given to the opportunities that exist outside the United States to obtain prejudgment
attachments to secure judgments that may ultimately be obtained
in U.S. courts (pp. 190-191).
Excellent advice from two litigators to readers who might
themselves be engaged in litigation. In a different book they
might also have concluded that it would be highly beneficial for
the United States to enter into a multilateral judgments with
our major trading partners, just as the European Union has
done for States within the EU and that are associated with it.28
As the authors well know the negotiations of such a convention
have begun at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, but the outcome of those negotiations is still far from
29
certain.
Unilateral action by the United States shows some promise
of leading the way towards international cooperation in one additional area, international bankruptcy. Several of the bankruptcies in recent years have been spectacular, and have
involved assets and creditors in a number of countries. Even
where the bankruptcies are of less individual import, they are of
momentous importance for the domestic creditors of a foreign
bankrupt. Perhaps the most sensitive of the issues has to do
with the question as to whether the assets of the bankrupt located in a particular country should be devoted first to the
claims of creditors from that country, or whether all of the assets and liabilities of the bankrupt should be treated globally.
There is little argument but that global treatment would be the
most desirable, if it could be achieved. However, bankruptcy regimes and the underlying policies that they represent differ so
28 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, September 30, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 36, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 229, (Brussels Convention). The Convention has been amended upon the
accession of new member States to the European Community, now the European
Union. A parallel convention between the state of the European Communities and
the European Free Trade Association is the Convention on Jurisdiction and enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, September 16, 1988,
1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, (Lugano Convention).

29 The most recent documents are posted on the Web site of the State Department's Office of Private International Law, <http:J/www.his.com.>
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greatly that all attempts to date to achieve agreement on such a
regime have floundered. Whatever progress there has been to
date has arisen out of the unilateral actions of a few individual
States, with the United States one of the most significant.
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code allows representatives
of estates in foreign bankruptcy proceedings to seek assistance
from U.S. bankruptcy courts through an ancillary proceeding.
Although the automatic stay provisions do not apply, since a
section 304 proceeding is not a full bankruptcy proceeding in
the United States, the court may issue a temporary restraining
order, which would have much the same effect. The assets of
the foreign estate located in the United States may be turned
over to the foreign representative for distribution in the primary bankruptcy proceeding and the court may "order other appropriate relief."30 While similar provisions often appear in
statutes, the need for flexibility in this area is especially great.
As noted in the legislative history, "[principles of international
comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other nations
suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than
being provided with inflexible rules." 3 1 The statute directs the
court to
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditions
administration of such estate, consistent with (1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in
such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceedings;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start
for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
30

11

31 11

U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(3) (West 1993).
U.S.C.A. § 304, Historical and Statutory Notes, citing Senate Report No.

95-989 (West 1993).
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Messrs. Newman and Zaslowsky inform us that, with the
exception of the proscription to foster a fresh start, all of the
other factors are subsumed in the notion of comity (p. 212). If
the foreign proceedings are in keeping with U.S. notions of justice, and fairly treat U.S. creditors, deference is due to those
proceedings.
Section 304 was not adopted solely out of an altruistic notion of deference to the primary proceedings in a foreign bankruptcy. One of the intentions of the drafters was the hope that
foreign countries would be induced to adopt similar provisions,
thereby easing the problems for the administration of the estate
of a U.S. debtor with foreign assets and liabilities. To date few
countries have followed suit. The authors cite a survey of
twelve countries that showed that only England and Switzerland had adopted laws similar to section 304 (p. 215).
That situation may not last long. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has undertaken, as a first step in this area, the preparation of model
legislative provisions for cross-border insolvencies. The work
has gone much faster than might have been expected, given the
lack of success that has been achieved in this field in the past,
and the expectations at the time of writing this review are the a
final text will be adopted by the Commission at its annual session in May 1997.32 Of course, adoption of model legislative
provisions by UNCITRAL or any other international body does
not assure their adoption by States. Nevertheless, the time
seems ripe for progress in this field and the reaching of international agreement through UNCITRAL gives hope that the goal
of the drafters of section 304 to foster reciprocal legislative activity in other countries may soon be achieved.
CONCLUSION

If the past thirty years have been years of great change in
the rules and practice governing international commercial litigation, the next thirty years promise to be years of further
32 Citing T. POWERS, SECTION 304: THE U.S. MODEL FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN BANKRuPTcy PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL LOAN WoRKoUs AND BANKRupTcy, at 100-103 (1989). The countries involved in the survey were: Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
and the Netherlands.
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change. It is fortunate that the authors and publisher plan to
update the current book annually. We can be sure that there
will be sufficient new developments to warrant the new editions. This is one of the best guides through this difficult field; a
book that is well written, that tells us where we are at the moment and that gives practical advice to the non-specialist for
whom this book was written.
One volume, softbound, $50.00, annual editions. The book can
be ordered by calling 1-800-328-9352.
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